For decades, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was presented as the ultimate nightmare scenario for the global economy. Analysts spoke endlessly about $200 oil, a global recession, financial panic, and the collapse of energy-intensive economies. And yet, more than three months after the effective paralysis of the most strategic maritime chokepoint in the world, oil prices remain below 100 dollars per barrel. The question is no longer why markets panicked. The real question is why they did not panic more. Because what the world is currently experiencing is, objectively, one of the largest supply shocks in modern energy history. More than 10 million barrels per day of Middle Eastern supply have effectively disappeared or become severely disrupted. Maritime traffic through Hormuz has collapsed from nearly 100 daily crossings before the war to only a handful of visible transits today. And still, the system has not broken. At least not yet.

The explanation lies in a combination of temporary buffers, emergency measures and what may ultimately prove to be a dangerous illusion of resilience. The first shock absorber came from the United States itself. The shale revolution transformed America from the world’s largest oil importer into a major oil supplier in an emergency. US crude and refined product exports surged to record levels after the beginning of the Iran conflict, exceeding previous yearly averages by more than 2 million barrels per day. Strategic reserves were released aggressively. Washington effectively used energy as a geopolitical weapon to stabilise markets while simultaneously escalating tensions in the Middle East. This would have been unimaginable twenty years ago. Ironically, the same America that helped destabilise part of the region became the only actor capable of partially replacing the missing barrels.

The second stabilising factor came from China. The collapse in Chinese crude demand surprised almost everybody. Imports fell nearly 40% in May compared with previous averages. Refinery throughput dropped to levels not seen since the early pandemic period. Electric vehicles, weaker growth, strategic stockpiles and structural changes in industrial production all contributed to reducing Chinese oil appetite at precisely the moment global markets feared panic buying. China unintentionally saved the oil market from itself. Without this collapse in demand, prices would almost certainly have moved violently higher.

The third factor was the emergence of a parallel logistical world operating in the shadows. Gulf countries rerouted exports through alternative pipelines. Some tankers continued to cross Hormuz under opaque arrangements, military protection, or government-backed agreements. GPS disruptions, hidden shipping routes and increasingly non-transparent trading mechanisms became part of the new normal. Globalisation did not disappear. It simply became less visible.

But beneath this apparent stability, the system is deteriorating rapidly. Global inventories are collapsing at record speed. Strategic reserves are approaching exhaustion. US storage hubs are nearing operational minimums. Refineries are running close to maximum capacity. Freight costs continue rising. And every additional week of disruption removes another 70 to 80 million barrels from the system. The market is surviving by consuming its own buffers. That is not an equilibrium. That is controlled depletion. This is precisely why the current situation may be more dangerous than an immediate price spike to $ 200. A violent shock would likely have triggered coordinated political responses, emergency diplomacy and immediate demand destruction. Instead, the world is experiencing something far more insidious: a slow-burning energy squeeze progressively feeding inflation across transport, manufacturing, fertilisers, food and logistics without triggering a full systemic panic.

The inflationary consequences are therefore gradually spreading throughout the entire economic system. And central banks know it. The Federal Reserve now faces an increasingly impossible dilemma. Inflation remains structurally elevated due to energy and logistics costs, even as growth weakens. Europe faces even greater vulnerability due to its dependence on imported energy. Emerging markets are already entering defensive mode, with countries such as India, Turkey and Indonesia struggling to defend their currencies and reserves against imported inflationary shocks. The consequences for the dollar may eventually become paradoxical. In the short term, the dollar still benefits from fear and from its status as the world’s reserve currency. But over time, this crisis also exposes the growing fragility of the American financial model itself. The United States is financing massive fiscal deficits while simultaneously draining its strategic reserves at an extraordinary pace. Foreign central banks facing domestic currency pressure may eventually need to liquidate part of their Treasury holdings to defend their own financial systems. Meanwhile, rising energy prices continue to feed inflation into the US economy, keeping long-term yields structurally elevated.

The system remains stable only as long as confidence survives. And confidence increasingly depends on temporary emergency mechanisms rather than structural equilibrium. This is why the market’s apparent calm may be profoundly misleading. Oil below 100 dollars does not necessarily mean the crisis has been contained. It may simply mean that the world is consuming its final stabilisation mechanisms before the real shortages begin to emerge. Because the uncomfortable reality is becoming increasingly visible. The world did not avoid the energy shock. It merely postponed its full consequences.