Markets celebrated the announcement of the interim agreement between the United States and Iran as though geopolitical risk had suddenly disappeared. Investors immediately priced the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the return of Iranian exports and the end of the energy shock that had dominated markets for almost four months. Yet they may be missing the most important part of the agreement. This is not simply a peace deal. It is the beginning of one of the largest geopolitical reintegration programmes of the past two decades. Behind the headlines lies an extraordinary economic package. According to the draft memorandum circulating among governments, Iran would immediately regain the ability to export crude oil and petrochemical products. US Treasury waivers would suspend key sanctions. Shipping routes would progressively reopen. Frozen Iranian assets could eventually become accessible. More remarkably, the agreement envisages an international reconstruction and development programme worth at least $300 billion, financed by the United States’ regional partners and private investors rather than directly by Washington.

The irony is difficult to ignore. For years, Washington’s strategy consisted of economically isolating Iran. Today, the objective appears to be exactly the opposite. The United States is not simply seeking peace. It is attempting to transform Iran into a functioning economic actor once again. The implications for global energy markets are considerable. Iran possesses some of the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves. The reopening of Hormuz, combined with the gradual restoration of Iranian exports and the recovery of Qatari LNG production, could substantially increase global energy supply over the coming months. The immediate consequence is obvious: lower oil prices, easing inflationary pressures and reduced energy costs for both developed and emerging economies.

But this is only the first-round effect. The second-order consequences may prove far more important. Lower energy prices reduce inflation. Lower inflation eases pressure on central banks. Monetary tightening may therefore become less aggressive than markets feared only a few weeks ago. However, this should not be confused with a return to the world that existed before the war. The structural landscape has changed. Energy infrastructure across the Gulf has suffered significant damage. Shipping routes remain vulnerable. Insurance costs have permanently increased. Governments have accelerated defence spending. Strategic energy reserves will need to be rebuilt. Geopolitical risk has acquired a permanent price. In other words, while oil may become cheaper, capital will probably not.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the agreement is what it reveals about Washington itself. For months, the United States justified military intervention on the grounds of regional security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Now it is offering economic incentives of historic proportions. The message is clear. Military pressure was never intended to become a permanent strategy. Economic normalisation has always been the real objective. Whether one agrees with that strategy or not, it represents a profound shift in American foreign policy. Instead of containing geopolitical rivals indefinitely, Washington increasingly appears willing to reintegrate them, provided they operate within a framework largely designed by the United States.

For financial markets, this creates both opportunities and risks. Emerging markets could benefit from lower energy costs, particularly large oil importers such as India, Turkey and much of South-East Asia. Global inflation expectations may continue falling, supporting corporate profitability. Yet investors should remain cautious. The agreement remains provisional. It still requires implementation. Major issues, including Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions relief, frozen assets, regional security and Israel’s position, remain unresolved. Neither side fully trusts the other. And every stage of implementation creates opportunities for political disruption. The market is celebrating certainty that simply does not yet exist.

For the dollar, the implications are equally complex. Initially, lower oil prices may reduce inflation and support risk appetite, limiting demand for traditional safe-haven assets. But over the medium term, if global energy markets normalise and capital once again flows towards emerging markets, part of the extraordinary dollar demand generated by the geopolitical crisis could gradually reverse. This reinforces the structural view we have developed over recent weeks. The dollar’s long-term vulnerability has never been about oil alone. It reflects expanding fiscal deficits, higher structural borrowing needs and the gradual diversification of global capital. A more stable Middle East merely removes one of the temporary supports that strengthened the dollar during the crisis. History often teaches the same lesson. Wars destroy capital. Peace reallocates it. The real question for investors is no longer whether the fighting ends. It is where the next wave of global capital will go once it does.