The latest development in the Strait of Hormuz is more important than another temporary reopening. Iran says it has reached a revenue-sharing agreement with Oman covering the strategic waterway. According to the Revolutionary Guards, the two countries have agreed on how revenues generated from the Strait would be divided, even though Oman has publicly declined to confirm that such an agreement exists. If Tehran’s interpretation is correct, the argument over Hormuz is changing. It is no longer simply about whether ships can pass. It is about whether passage can be monetised. That distinction matters enormously.

Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG passed through the Strait of Hormuz. The economic system surrounding that traffic was built on the assumption that the Strait was an international shipping route, not an infrastructure asset from which regional powers could systematically extract revenue. Iran is now trying to change that assumption. It initially imposed transit charges on some vessels before reframing them as service payments. Oman has publicly opposed formal transit fees, while reportedly acknowledging privately that vessels could eventually pay for related services. The vocabulary is important. A toll is politically explosive. A service charge sounds administrative. Economically, the distinction may become much smaller. If shipping companies must pay for escort, navigation, security, clearance, or other mandatory services to cross safely, Hormuz effectively imposes a price. And once that price is in place, the geopolitical consequences extend well beyond the current conflict.

Iran would have transformed military disruption into a recurring source of economic leverage. Instead of threatening periodically to close the Strait, Tehran could seek to institutionalise its influence over the traffic passing through it. That may ultimately be more valuable. A closed Hormuz damages Iran as well as everyone else. Iranian oil exports, imports and access to foreign currency also depend on maritime traffic. A partially open Hormuz under a system in which Iran participates in controlling access and collecting revenue is different. It allows Tehran to preserve pressure without accepting economic self-destruction. This helps explain why the negotiations with Oman matter. Muscat provides something neither Washington nor Tehran can easily provide alone: a politically acceptable intermediary with territory directly adjacent to the Strait. A revenue-sharing mechanism could therefore become the commercial architecture supporting an interim reopening. But it also creates a dangerous precedent. If insecurity allows the country partly responsible for that insecurity to charge for restoring safe passage, disruption itself acquires economic value. That is an uncomfortable incentive. It potentially turns maritime security from a public good into a negotiating asset.

Washington understands the problem. Donald Trump insists that the Strait is open, that mines have been removed and that significant quantities of oil are already passing through. Iran says the opposite, arguing that only Tehran knows where explosives remain and that normalisation requires broader American concessions. The disagreement is therefore no longer simply factual. It is institutional. Who decides that Hormuz is open? Who guarantees navigation? Who determines which vessels can transit? And increasingly, who gets paid? Those questions matter more than whether ten million barrels crossed on a particular day. Markets have nevertheless responded to the possibility of an interim arrangement. Brent has fallen by around 7% this week to above $88 as traders price a greater probability that more oil could eventually move through the Strait. That reaction is rational. More physical supply means less immediate scarcity. But lower oil prices should not be confused with a return to the previous regime.

A corridor governed through negotiation between Iran and Oman, potentially involving payments for services, is fundamentally different from unrestricted commercial navigation. The risk premium may decline. The political premium should remain. There is also a contradiction in Washington’s strategy. The US is tightening economic sanctions in an attempt to deprive Iran of revenues while negotiations over Hormuz could create a new revenue stream linked directly to the strategic asset Iran controls most effectively. The harder Washington restricts Iranian oil income, the more valuable alternative sources of leverage become. Hormuz is the obvious one. This is why Iran continues to insist that reopening requires sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and an end to the naval blockade. Tehran does not see navigation as a separate technical discussion. It sees it as part of the economic settlement of the war.

The emerging deal with Oman, therefore, represents progress but not normalisation. Ships may eventually move more freely. Oil prices may fall. Insurance costs may ease. But something important may already have changed. Before the war, Hormuz was principally a route through which energy travelled. Iran is now trying to turn it into an asset through which political power and revenue travel as well. The Strait may reopen. The real question is whether the world will discover that passage through Hormuz now comes with a price.