The rise of the AfD in eastern Germany is usually presented as an electoral story. It is becoming an economic one. Its 44% result in Saxony-Anhalt is remarkable not only because it is the party’s strongest regional performance, but also because the programme behind it challenges several pillars of Germany’s post-2022 strategy at the same time: energy policy, relations with Russia, migration, climate policy, and ultimately Germany’s place in Europe.

The most immediate issue is gas. Germany accepted one of the largest economic shocks in its post-war history when it cut itself off from cheap Russian pipeline energy. The political logic was clear: reduce dependence on Moscow, support Ukraine and align economic policy with national-security objectives. The economic cost was equally clear. German industry lost access to an energy source that had underpinned its competitiveness for decades. Chemicals, metals, glass, fertilisers and other energy-intensive sectors have since faced structurally higher input costs. LNG diversification improved security of supply, but it did not recreate the old price.

The AfD’s call to restore relations with Russia therefore speaks directly to an economic frustration that goes well beyond ideology. For many voters in eastern Germany, Russian gas is not simply about Moscow. It is about electricity bills. Factory closures. Industrial employment. And the perception that Berlin accepted economic pain without producing an obvious economic reward. This is politically powerful because Germany now faces another period of elevated energy prices, even as growth remains weak. A government can defend sanctions when prosperity is strong. It becomes harder when households and companies are asked to finance geopolitical strategy through permanently higher costs. But reopening the Russian energy relationship would not simply mean cheaper gas. It would reverse a strategic shift Germany has spent four years trying to make irreversible. Berlin has invested heavily in LNG infrastructure, alternative suppliers, storage capacity and renewable energy precisely to ensure that Russia could no longer use energy dependence as political leverage.

A return to Russian gas would therefore create an awkward question. Was the lesson of 2022 that dependence was dangerous? Or merely that dependence was temporarily inconvenient? The answer would matter far beyond Germany. If Europe’s largest economy were to reopen the door to Russian energy, maintaining a unified EU sanctions policy would become considerably harder. Countries already sceptical of sanctions would gain political cover. Moscow would acquire leverage not through military victory in Ukraine, but through Europe’s domestic political exhaustion. That would be strategically significant. Russia would discover that time itself can weaken sanctions. The longer economic pressure lasts, the greater the probability that elections eventually produce governments prepared to reopen trade. This is one reason Moscow can afford patience. But the consequences extend beyond Russia.

The AfD also wants to reverse large parts of Germany’s green transition. Those two positions reinforce each other. If climate policy is perceived as responsible for higher electricity prices while Russian gas is remembered as cheap and reliable, the energy transition becomes politically vulnerable. Germany could then face a double reversal: less commitment to Russian disengagement and less commitment to decarbonisation. That would affect investment. Companies committing billions to German battery plants, hydrogen projects, grids and renewable infrastructure require regulatory stability over decades. If each election creates the possibility that energy strategy will be rewritten, political risk enters the discount rate.

The irony is obvious. A policy designed to restore industrial competitiveness through cheaper energy could simultaneously weaken investment by making the future policy framework less predictable. The same applies to migration. Germany’s ageing economy needs labour. The AfD’s success is built partly on opposition to immigration and proposals for large-scale removals. Yet restricting migration while the domestic working-age population declines would intensify labour shortages precisely when Germany needs to rebuild defence, infrastructure and industry. Cheap energy without workers does not create competitiveness. Nor does cheap gas solve Germany’s fiscal problem. The country is entering a period of much greater public investment in defence and infrastructure while borrowing costs are rising. Restoring Russian energy could reduce some industrial costs and imported inflation, but it would not remove demographic pressure, weak productivity growth or the enormous capital requirements of economic restructuring.

That is why the Saxony-Anhalt result matters. It reveals that Germany’s geopolitical choices are beginning to face a domestic economic test. The post-2022 consensus assumed voters would accept higher costs in exchange for greater strategic autonomy. That assumption can no longer be taken for granted. The question is not simply whether Germany will buy Russian gas again. It is whether economic frustration eventually forces Europe’s largest economy to reconsider the broader architecture built after the invasion of Ukraine. Energy policy. Climate policy. Sanctions. Migration. European solidarity. They are becoming part of the same political argument. Germany thought it had closed the Russian chapter. Its voters may be reopening it.